Kremlin suspected of flying drones over Europe using Russian shadow fleet

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) used AIS maritime data and open‑source reporting to map 144 drone sightings that it deems inconsistent with hobbyist activity. Nearly half of those flights hovered over military installations, a quarter over ports and energy sites, and the remainder over civilian airports. The pattern clusters around vessels that transport sanctioned Russian oil—most notably the tanker Boracay, which was near Denmark during a September 2025 incident, and the Hav Dolphin, flagged in Antigua and Barbuda but operated by a Russian crew, which docked in the UK during November 2024 and later loitered off Kiel in May 2025. The only incident the Russian government has openly acknowledged involved the signals‑intelligence ship Zhigulevsk launching a drone in Swedish waters while the French carrier Charles de Gaulle was nearby.

The report points to several Russian UAV platforms that could be deployed from merchant decks. The fixed‑wing Merlin‑VR, launched by catapult and recovered by parachute, offers night‑time loitering capability; the compact VTOL Legioner E29 fits on limited deck space; and the workhorse Orlan‑10, with a 500 km range, 12‑hour endurance and payload options for GPS spoofing and signal interception, matches eyewitness accounts of noisy, low‑speed drones over RAF Lakenheath and other bases. By adapting either purpose‑built or commercial drones, Moscow can obscure attribution while probing NATO air‑defence readiness. This mirrors earlier Russian tactics of using civilian‑maritime assets for covert operations, but the scale—multiple coordinated flights over sites that host U.S. nuclear weapons such as Kleine‑Brogel, Ramstein, and Volkel—suggests a deliberate escalation aimed at normalising low‑level airspace violations.

If European air‑defence systems remain tuned to high‑altitude threats, low‑cost UAVs launched from the high seas will continue to slip through detection nets, creating a “grey zone” where escalation is ambiguous. Nations will need to integrate maritime AIS monitoring with radar and electro‑optical sensors to flag vessels capable of drone launch, and consider legal frameworks for intercepting or boarding suspect ships in international waters. Watch for NATO’s response in upcoming joint exercises, potential sanctions targeting shadow‑fleet operators, and any further public attribution of drone launches to Russian SIGINT ships, which could trigger a more overt confrontation.